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RESUMEN
El análisis cuantitativo y comparativo de las exportaciones corcheras
españolas y portuguesas durante el sigloXXmuestra que España perdió el
liderazgo en el comercio mundial de manufacturas del corcho en beneficio
de Portugal, que pasó a ocupar la primera posición en este comercio. Este
artículo trata de avanzar en la identificación de los aspectos institucionales
que estuvieron detrás de las diferentes trayectorias seguidas por el negocio
corchero en los dos países entre 1930 y 1975. Partiendo del análisis com-
parativo del marco legal y de las políticas económicas que afectaron a las
distintas vertientes del negocio corchero durante las dictaduras ibéricas, se
argumenta que fue diferente la atención prestada por Salazar y Franco al
sector del corcho. Finalmente, se concluye que los aspectos institucionales
pueden explicar una parte de la pérdida de competitividad de las exporta-
ciones españolas respecto a las portuguesas, en la medida en que influye-
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1 Until 1930 Portugal was responsible for 45 per cent of world cork production, folowed by
Spain with 29 per cent with other Mediterranean nations such as Algeria, France, Italy, Morocco
and Tunisia producing the remaining 26 per cent; Almeida (1931, p. 13).
ron en el grado de inserción de las respectivas economías en los flujos de
comercio internacional, y que afectaron a los costes de producción de esta
industria.
Palabras clave:Portugal, España, corcho, comercio de corcho, política
económica
ABSTRACT
The quantitative and comparative analysis of Spanish and Portuguese
cork exportations during the 20thcentury shows that Spain lost its leading
position in the world trade of transformed cork while Portugal rose to claim
first place. This article takes a step towards identifying the institutional
aspects behind the different paths taken by the cork business in the two
countries between 1930 and 1975. Starting with a comparative analysis of
the legal framework and economic policies which had an impact on the
various branches of business during the two Iberian dictatorships, it is
argued that Salazar and Franco attributed different degrees of importance
to the cork sector. It concludes that these institutional aspects explain a part
of the loss of competitiveness of Spanish exports in comparison with
Portuguese exports, insofar as they influenced the extent to which the two
economies participated in international trade flows as wel as production
costs in the industry.
Keywords: Portugal, Spain, cork, cork trade, economic policy
Jel Classification:N54, N64, N74
INTRODUCTION
Although Portugal and Spain had an important natural advantage in the
production of cork —being part of a smal Mediterranean region where the
cork oak grows1, that reduced «cork-producing world» as described by
Natividade (1950)—, the route taken by these two countries’ cork exports
has always been different, both in terms of values and structure, reflecting
heterogeneous characteristics of the respective industries. However, this
heterogeneity existed alongside another characteristic which was common
INCENTIVES OR OBSTACLES? INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CORK BUSINESS IN THE..
19
2 Speaking of semi-manufactured products, reference is made to cork which underwent some
preparatory operations, before being transformed. The main semi-transformed product is cork-
wood in planks, from which cork stoppers are made, this being the most important manufac-
tured product for the industry. In this article we wil take into account two broad categories of
cork products: unmanufactured and manufactured. Unmanufactured, or non-transformed cork,
includes raw cork and semi-manufactured products; manufactured cork, or transformed cork,
includes manufactured products made from natural cork and agglomerates.
3 The relevance of institutional aspects for economic growth has been studied by several
authors. For their contributions towards the definition of institutions and their role in econo-
mic growth, the folowing works are of prime importance: Wolf Jr. (1955); North (1989); Hal
and Jones (1999).
4 Zamagni (2000, pp. 307-310) has described the similarities between the dictatorial regi-
mes of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.
to both countries: the fact that their cork production was destined mainly
for the external market, with the evolution of exports shaping the dynamics
of the business.
During the 19thcentury —in which cork acquired economic importance
on a worldwide scale— and in the first third of the 20thcentury, Portuguese
cork exports were dominated by raw material and semi-manufactured pro-
ducts2, reflecting the weakness of Portugal’s transforming industry. On the
other hand, the modernity of the Catalonian cork industry and its geogra-
phical proximity to the main wine-growing regions of Europe gave Spain
top place in manufactured cork exports.
As Dias and Parejo (2006a) pointed out, the 1930s were marked by sig-
nificant changes in world cork markets. The Great Depression led to a
decrease in international demand and an increase in protectionism, espe-
cialy in the field of manufactured products. This setting affected Spanish
cork exports more severely because, unlike Portuguese exports, they con-
sisted predominantly of manufactured cork. The Spanish Civil War (1936-
1939) prolonged the fal in Spain’s exports even more and these were over-
taken in volume by Portugal, although Portugal did not change its speciali-
zation in terms of cork production. After the Spanish Civil War, the weak
signs of a recovery in the sector disappeared during the first years of
Franco’s dictatorship and Spain never regained its leading position in the
cork business. Portugal, aided by the policies imposed by Salazar’s regime,
saw its position in the world cork trade reinforced, consolidating its lea-
dership and adjusting its export specialization, with transformed cork pro-
ducts becoming increasingly important.
The aim of this article is to explore the connection between the institu-
tional setting of the economy created in the period of the dictatorships and
the different paths folowed by the cork exports in the two Iberian coun-
tries3. This objective is reinforced by the major similarities which exist bet-
ween the Salazar and Franco regimes4, such as strong intervention in the
economy and strict control of private initiative. Such characteristics were
even more marked in sectors with a certain economic importance, which
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5 If we take the weight of cork exports in total exports of both countries for the 1930s as a
reference, the values for cork and its by-products are around 4 per cent of total Spanish exports
and 15 per cent in the case of Portugal; Dias and Parejo (2006a, p. 37).
6 Taking the same indicator, the weight of cork exports in total exports of Spain and Portu-
gal at the end of the Iberian dictatorships was only 0.5 and 6 per cent, respectively; Dias and
Parejo (2006a, p. 37).
7 Term applied to the dictatorial regime set up in 1933 which prevailed until 1974.
was the case of the cork sector where institutional aspects became determi-
nants of the behaviour of agents in this business.
In fact, in the 1930s, this sector enjoyed considerable economic impor-
tance in the Iberian economies, not only in terms of trading income and for
obtaining currency, but equaly due to its significance in the forestry sec-
tor5. In the folowing decades, as Zapata (2008) stated, the cork industry
deteriorated in Spain and improved in Portugal. However, in both Iberian
countries, the cork sector became less important in the economy and in tra-
ding statistics, as shown by al the indicators6.
Despite the similarities referred to, we argue that the instruments of eco-
nomic policy used, along with their incidence in the sector, were different,
especialy in the case of the cork industry where these differences might
have caused the expansion of the cork industry in Portugal and its deterio-
ration in Spain. We postulate the hypothesis that the legal framework in
which agents operated in this industry and the measures implemented at
trading policy level —and here some measures concerning customs policies
and exchange rate measures are included— and industrial policy, influen-
ced cork exports.
In this context, we conclude that the institutional aspects condition the
evolution of the cork business in both countries; in the case of Portugal,
because they stimulated the development of the cork production industry
and its exportation; and, on the contrary, in the Spanish case, because they
created serious obstacles to the success of the cork industry and Spanish
cork exports, preventing this country from recovering from the deep crisis
of the 1930s.
The choice of this time period which coincided with the two dictators-
hips also appears to be useful for two reasons. On one hand, it was during
this period that the notorious alterations in the external aspects of the cork
business appeared, mirroring the different dynamics in the cork industry in
Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, as this article proposes the study of
institutional factors, it seems reasonable to choose the period in which dic-
tatorial regimes were in power, these being characterised by strong inter-
vention in the economy. In this way, the 1930s coincide with the laying of
the basic foundations of Estado Novo7in Portugal, at the same time mar-
king the beginning of a brief Republican period in Spain which would cul-
minate in the Civil War (1936-1939), the origin of Franco’s dictatorial regi-
me. The year 1975 is near to the end of the «golden years» of European
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8 There are no statistics for internal consumption of cork products for Spain and Portugal,
consequently the information available is based on estimates made by various authors. For Por-
tugal, although internal consumption grew during the 20thcentury, Schmidt (1983) estimates
that it was stil below 20 per cent of industrial output in 1980. Data for Spain are even more
scarce. Medir (1953) states that internal consumption of cork manufactures around 1930 was
not higher than 8 or 10 per cent of Spanish exports. Similarly, Parejo (2002, p. 103) estimates
that the internal market constituted 22 per cent of industrial output in Spain in 1950. For the
period 1946-1959, the Sindicato Nacional de la Madera y el Corcho (SNMC) drew up statistics on
the internal market for cork products, but only for Catalonia; AMSP, SNMC, cajas 163-179, Esta-
dística del Mercado Nacional. Zona Nordeste.
9 For an overview of the industrial and forestry features of the business during this period,
one may consult Sampaio (1977 and 1985); Mendes (2002); GEHR (2003); Dias (2005 and 2008),
and Zapata (1996, 2002 and 2008).
10 The end of the 1920s was an exceptional moment for cork exports from Spain and Por-
tugal, with exports from both countries growing. This was strongly favoured by the improved
prices for cork on the international market; Sala (2003, pp. 209-215).
growth, which is also clear in the Portuguese and Spanish economies after
the 1950s. Above al, however, it marks the end of the Spanish dictatorship,
one year after the end of Estado Novoin Portugal.
After the introduction, this article is divided into three parts. The first
contains a quantitative analysis of both countries’ cork exports to determi-
ne their evolution and the structural changes which occurred in terms of
the added value of the goods sold. In the second part, some of the possible
causes which alowed Portugal to reach the leading position as the main
exporting country of transformed cork, due to the crisis in the Spanish cork
industry, are discussed. Finaly, in the last part, the main conclusions are
drawn.
1.  CORK EXPORTS IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA, 1930-1975
We are led to consider exports as being the main indicator in an evoluti-
ve assessment of the cork business in the Iberian Peninsula by the fact that
the external market was always, at least until the 1970s and 1980s, the main
destination for cork production —and almost exclusively so in Portugal’s
case8. A study of cork exports is, then, the best way to assess the health of
the business in Spain and Portugal, in the same way that the evolution of
the export structure can serve as a means to assess the dynamics of the
industrial part of the sector in both countries9.
Graph 1 shows the evolution of Spanish and Portuguese exports of cork
products as wel as the evolution of exports from both countries, the latter
considered as a comparative reference. A first reading suggests that we are
analysing a declining business during the period in question, as we can see
by the decrease in Spanish cork exports and in the Iberian Peninsula (Spain
and Portugal, together), although in Portugal export levels in the 1970s are
slightly higher than those of the 1930s10. Bearing in mind the fact that the
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11 The gains obtained by Portuguese (Spanish) exporters in a certain conjuncture corres-
pond to the losses of Spanish (Portuguese) exporters during the same period. This hypothesis is
not far from the truth if we accept the blockage in international demand for cork products —
see Parejo (2006, pp. 251-253); the fact that the major cork markets for Spanish and Portuguese
products were, mostly, the same (our opinion after analysing the external trade statistics for both
countries); and also, if we reject the hypothesis that Spanish cork products and/or Portuguese
ones could have been substituted by cork products from other countries. This last fact is even
more acceptable when we see that after the Second World War the great industrial powers had
started to abandon the transformation of cork, although the advance of synthetic substitutes in
the uses of cork requires further study.
world cork export market was dominated by these two Iberian countries,
according to the estimates made by Parejo (2008), it can be concluded that
international demand for cork products fel, or at least did not grow, during
the period under analysis.
There is a clear difference between the pattern of exports folowed by
Portugal and Spain during this 45-year period. Broadly speaking, in
Portugal’s case there was a gradual increase in this business, while in
Spain’s case, on the contrary, there was a marked decrease in exports, espe-
cialy until the 1950s.
If we look at the economic settings in both countries, there are also
important differences which we believe also balance each other out11.
Firstly, the crisis of the 1930s affected the cork sector of both countries in
different ways (graph 1). In fact, the initial decrease in Spanish exports was
more marked and faster, probably because they consisted mainly of manu-
factured products which were more sensitive to the commercial protectio-
nism of the time. Portuguese exports resisted the crisis better and recovered
quickly from the initial fal, growing markedly until 1936.
The evolution of the results between the years of the Spanish Civil War
and the 1950s was also different. In this period, Spain’s exports continued
to fal sharply while Portugal’s performance was irregular, growing until
1935, faling in the folowing years and until the end of the Second World
War before recovering and, in 1948, reaching the same levels as 1935.
A last and divergent setting coincides almost exactly with the decade of
the 1950s. The trend of Spanish cork exports improved, however the good
results must be seen in the context of recovery after twenty years of deep
crisis. The fal in Portuguese results corresponds, essentialy, to structural
changes in the country’s exports which wil be treated in the second part of
this article.
It is only possible to speak of an evolutive convergence in the series after
1960, although in a setting which was clearly favourable to Portuguese
exports. There were two aspects behind this convergence. On one hand, the
changes which took place in the world cork trade, described in Parejo
(2006) and Zapata (2002), which had major repercussions on international
demand for cork; and on the other hand, the new international economic
context of the two Iberian countries.
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12 Ferreirinha (1984, p. 186).
The latter wil be dealt with in the second part of this article. The first
aspect is connected to the virtual demise of the cork transformation
industry in more developed countries (such as the United States, Germany
and the United Kingdom), non-producers of the raw material, and whose
cork industry, in a certain way, was directed towards the internal market12.
The effect of the end of industrial activity in the sector in these countries
has been described by Zapata (2002) as the «Iberization» of the cork busi-
ness, meaning the concentration of al aspects of this business in Portugal
and Spain.
These changes in the world cork business implied a reduction in its
international dimension, even more so in the case of non-manufactured
GRAPH 1
CORK EXPORT PRODUCTS, 1930-1975
(milion 2000 USD)
Source:Dias and Parejo (2006a).
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cork, where Portugal has always been the main supplier. As a consequence,
since the mid-twentieth century, most of the raw material from Portugal,
previously exported to Great Britain or the United States, began to be trans-
formed by the Portuguese industry, a fact which led, on one hand, to a slight
decrease in Portugal’s cork sales (graph 1), and on the other hand, to an
improvement in the participation of transformed products in the total of its
cork exports.
This statement is further reinforced quantitatively in graph 2, regarding
the structure of cork exports. In our analysis, we consider the hypothesis
that the changes which occurred in the exporting structure are indicative of
the changes which took place in the productive and commercial specializa-
tions in each country. In this way, we can state that the retraction of the cork
business in Spain and its expansion in Portugal gave rise to structural chan-
ges in the business.
Graph 2 shows us, again, the different paths taken by the cork business
in Spain and Portugal in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. In Spain, non-trans-
formed products represented less than 20 per cent of cork exports in 1930-
32, a percentage which, according to Parejo (2004, p. 38), was even lower at
the beginning of the 20th century. Later, due to the above-mentioned con-
junctural difficulties —the Great Depression, the Civil War and the begin-
nings of the Franco regime—, the Spanish cork industry suffered a long and
severe crisis in which the relative importance of cork manufactures fel in
the total exported. In 1948-1950, these manufactures represented slightly
more than 50 per cent of cork exports, a percentage which reveals the pre-
sence of deep changes, both in the industrial framework and in the Spanish
specialization in the business, which ceased to be so markedly oriented
towards transformed products.
On the other hand, Portugal, whose exports were mainly based on semi-
transformed cork products, seems not to have taken advantage of the nega-
tive experience of its main competitor and, initialy, was incapable of imple-
menting a change in the composition of its cork exports. These were stil
mainly dominated by unmanufactured cork until the 1940s and even until
the 1950s. In this way, Portugal’s leadership in exports, which we can see in
graph 1, came about without any alteration in the traditional specialization
in unmanufactured cork. Only after the Korean War (1950-53), was
Portugal’s leading position consolidated, with transformed products consti-
tuting over 50 per cent of the value exported, reaching 75 per cent at the end
of the period under analysis.
A different interpretation of graph 2 is possible. If we look at the three
figures of the graph at the same time, we confirm that the cork exporting
business in the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) was initialy domi-
nated by Spain, at least until the Civil War. Afterwards, the evolution of the
exportation structure of the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) is very
similar to the Portuguese case, a clear sign that the cork business was now
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GRAPH 2
CORK EXPORT STRUCTURE, 1930-1975
Source:Dias and Parejo (2006a).
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dominated by this country; in other words, in the 1940s, the world cork
business, seen from the perspective of exports, was already in Portuguese
hands.
This is a central aspect in this quantitative analysis because it represents
the loss of leadership by Spain in the world cork business to Portugal. We
argue that this brings a loss of competitiveness to Spanish cork exports
which can equaly be assessed through an observation of the evolution of
the two countries’ quotas in the total exported. In table 1, we can see the
development of this indicator in accordance with the degree to which the
products were transformed.
Table 1 does not leave any room for doubt. Between 1930 and 1975,
Spain saw its quota of exports decrease from 70 to 23 per cent, a downturn
which was even more marked in the sector of manufactured cork where, in
the 1930s, it had dominated over 80 per cent of the market.
These values are even more significant when the relationship between
the total value exported by Spain and Portugal is taken into account. At the
beginning of the 1930s, this indicator was favourable to Spain by over 200
per cent, bearing witness to its dominant position, mainly in the trade of
manufactured cork in which the ratio was over 700 per cent. The difficul-
ties brought about by the Civil War in Spain led to a sharp decline in these
TABLE 1
SPAIN AND PORTUGAL:
EXPORT QUOTAS AND RELATIVE COMPARED EVOLUTION
SPAIN/“SPAIN+PORT” (%)   PORT/“SPAIN+PORT” (%) SPAIN/PORT (%)
Cork   Manufact.  Unmanuf.   Cork   Manufact.  Unmanuf.   Cork   Manufact.  Unmanuf.
products   cork   cork   products   cork   cork   products   cork   cork
1930-32   70   88   38   30   12   62   235   719   61
1933-35   52   77   24   48   23   76   110   328   32
1936-39   —   —   —   —   —   —   —   —   —
1940-41   28   36   22   72   64   78   39   56   28
1942-44   28   17   36   72   83   64   38   56   21
1945-47   11   16   6   89   84   94   12   19   7
1948-50   9   11   7   91   89   93   10   13   8
1951-53   11   18   6   89   82   94   12   21   6
1954-57   16   24   9   84   76   91   19   32   9
1958-60   22   25   18   78   75   82   28   34   21
1961-63   22   25   19   78   75   81   29   33   24
1964-66   20   22   17   80   78   83   25   27   21
1967-69   22   23   21   78   77   79   29   29   27
1970-72   24   25   23   76   75   77   32   33   30
1973-75   23   22   26   77   78   74   30   28   35
Source:Dias e Parejo (2006a).
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percentages and manufactured cork fel to just 28 per cent of the Iberian
Peninsula’s exports; a marked fal in a very reduced period of time.
The improvement of the relative position of Spanish unmanufactured
cork should also be highlighted after the 1960s, in contrast with manufac-
tured cork, reinforcing the significance of the changes in the exporting
structure of cork products in Spain. In any case, Portugal’s leadership in the
business is clear, both in manufactured and unmanufactured cork. In 1975,
Portuguese exports represented around 77 per cent of the total exported by
both Iberian countries.
Having drawn a picture of the evolution of Iberian cork exports and
underlined the most significant turning points, we intend to propose certain
explanatory aspects for further study, factors which may explain the decre-
asing trend of Spanish exports —and the better performance of the
Portuguese; and equaly, in Portugal’s case, the causes of the evolution in
under two decades, from a business dominated for several decades by the
exportation of raw materials to a business dominated by manufactured cork
products.
In our argument, we defend the thesis that the new characteristics of the
Iberian cork business were partialy shaped by the existing institutional fra-
mework in the economy and by the economic and sectorial policies imple-
mented during this period. This thesis is sustained by the coincidental
timing of these changes and a set of measures which directly and indirectly
affected the cork sector, measures which provided a boost to the growing
industrialization of the cork sector in Portugal and/or blocked the indus-
trialization of cork in Spain.
2.  THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
IN THE HETEROGENEOUS PATH FOLLOWED
BY THE CORK BUSINESS IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN
As stated above, the Great Depression and the Spanish Civil War drag-
ged Spain’s cork industry into a deep crisis. Regarding the former, the incre-
ase in protectionism in relation to transformed products led to the fal in
exports of manufactured cork in which Spain was more specialised.
Moreover, the Civil War led the Spanish economy to a generalised stagna-
tion and, in the specific case of the cork sector, precipitated the loss of
Catalonia’s leadership in the production of manufactured products. The
territorial division which resulted from the conflict, separating areas where
raw material was gathered —the South-West, namely Andalusia and
Extremadura— and the areas where cork was transformed —Catalonia; as
wel as the syphoning of resources to finance the war effort, among other
aspects, obviously created difficulties for the development of the business in
Spain. To sum up, the Spanish cork industry, already depressed by the eco-
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13 A successful synthesis of the characteristics of this intervention for Portugal can be found
in Nunes and Brito (1990) and Nunes (1996). For Spain, there is a good bibliographical compi-
lation in Pires (1999).
nomic crisis which had begun in 1929, suffered another setback, affected by
the problems caused by supply of raw materials and by the lack of currency
for purchases of equipment and other auxiliary material from abroad.
However, although the decline in the Spanish cork industry may be
partly explained by the above-mentioned conditions, once this situation had
been overcome, Spain did not manage to regain its leading position in the
sector and so the success of the Portuguese cork industry or, rather, its capa-
city to take advantage of its main competitor’s misfortune, necessarily has
deeper roots.
An examination of institutional aspects may explain this last aspect bet-
ter, with great importance being attributed to the political and economic
setting in which both countries’ cork industries developed during the dicta-
torial regimes, this being taken as a set of political measures which shaped
the evolution of the cork sector’s economy.
Without intending to analyse al kinds of measures resulting from State
intervention in the different sectors of economic life13, we wil refer only to
those measures which we consider to have had the greatest impact on the
cork economy in Portugal and Spain. Among these, special attention has
been paid to the economic policies imposed by the two dictatorial regimes.
In fact, despite having similar objectives, the differences in the implemen-
tation in practical terms and in the priorities set in sectorial terms appear
to explain the difference in the development of the cork industry in Spain
and Portugal.
We shal begin by comparing the legal framework which regulated the
industrial sector in Spain and Portugal. In the case of Spain, and folowing
the scheme proposed by Pires (1999), intervention in and regulation of the
economy were determined by three laws: the Law for Organization and
Defence of National Industry (LODNI) — Ley de Ordenación y Defensa de la
Industria Nacional(1939); the Law for the Creation of the National Institute
of Industry — Instituto Nacional de Indústria(INI) (1941); and the Law for
Protection of the New Strategic Industries (LPNSI) — Ley de Protección de
las Nuevas Industrias de Interés Nacional(1939). In Portugal, the folowing
laws were important: Industrial Conditioning (IC); the Law of National
Electrification — Lei de Electrificação Nacional (1944); and the Law of
Industrial Development and Reorganization —Ley do Fomento e
Reorganização Industrial—  (1945).
In the next section, given the importance of external markets in the cork
business, we shal consider some peculiarities concerning cork in the scope
of the customs and exchange rate policies applied by the regimes of Salazar
and Franco.
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14 Sala (2003, pp. 127-136).
15 The industrial regulation implemented by the Iberian dictatorships has received the atten-
tion of Portuguese and Spanish researchers; for Spain, Buesa (1984); Pires (1999); Buesa and
Pires (2002); and Pires (2005). For Portugal, the important works are Brito (1989) and Confra-
ria (1992).
Finaly, taking as a hypothesis the loss of competitiveness of Spanish
exports compared with those of Portugal, the question of production costs
emerges as another fundamental aspect which could easily have been affec-
ted by the above-mentioned institutional aspects. This explanation gains
importance as both countries provided incentives for the reduction of pro-
duction costs in the industry, in terms of supply of raw materials from the
agricultural sector and in guaranteeing low salaries. It becomes essential,
therefore, to compare some aspects of the legal framework existing in the
labour market and that concerning forestry policy, bearing in mind the fact
that labour and raw materials represent three-quarters of the cork indus-
try’s costs14.
2.1.  The legal framework governing the cork business
and exporters in Spain and Portugal
In one of his main conclusions, Pires (1999) refers to a common charac-
teristic in the Iberian dictatorships that differentiates them clearly from the
European democracies: the large number of regulations they applied which
had a negative effect upon these countries’ convergence and economic
growth.
At the industrial level, the regulation of private initiative was carried out
by the IC in Portugal and by the application of the LODNI in Spain15.In
both cases, the control of private investment was translated into the fixing
of minimum criteria demanded of industrial establishments, by which they
were subject to an administrative authorization process concerning projects
to be set up or plans to expand their businesses. In both countries, moreo-
ver, the minimum criteria referred to were based on the physical size of the
establishments —assessed by the number of workers, level of production
and value of the business, among others—, while smal or micro industries
remained outside this regulation. However, despite these similarities in
terms of objectives, several differences between the two countries regarding
the criteria implemented and/or the degree to which they were applied can
be found. Thus, on one hand, in Spain the criteria required in the legisla-
tion were often different from those applied in practice, which was not the
case in Portugal, as Pires (1999) argues. The same study states that the
authorization for setting up a new company in Spain depended more on
discretional criteria than previously established norms. Consequently, it
was frequent in Spain to have authorization refused if the activity develo-
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ped required imported goods, in line with the lack of foreign currency in
Spain in the 1940s and 1950s. From this perspective, the development of the
cork industry in Spain could have been hindered because it needed auxi-
liary materials (such as casein and oxalic acid, for instance) from abroad,
products that had a higher price and a worse quality when obtained from
the internal market.
On the other hand, both the IC and the LODNI left the so-caled smal
family establishments outside the regulations; it was in these smaler
industries where most of the cork industry connected to natural cork
could be found —namely, the stopper industry; but not the agglomerates,
more demanding in terms of productive dimension and technology and
therefore more capital intensive16. After 1947, the stopper industry had
no restrictions concerning size. In this way, the most important subsector
—the stopper industry— remained outside the IC despite presenting cer-
tain characteristics —such as the excessive pulverization and dispersion
of the establishments—, which would have justified regulatory interven-
tion from the point of view of the IC’s objectives. On the contrary, the pro-
duction of agglomerates, of great importance in the Spanish cork
industry, was stil very insignificant in Portugal in the 1950s17and was
submitted to regulation.
However, the prejudicial results of Franco’s regulation on the Spanish
cork industry should be considered as relative. Pires (2005) and Buesa and
Pires (2002) analysed the regulation of industrial investment in Spain in
1940-1962 and 1963-1980 respectively. Although these authors do not carry
out a specific analysis of the cork business, their studies, which deal with
the industrial sector as a whole, alow us to obtain information on the
effects that this intervention had on the cork industry. From a consultation
of the processes regarding the requests for licences between 1940 and 1962,
Pires (2005) simply presents three processes concerning the opening and
modification of industrial cork establishments, permission for al three pro-
cesses having been granted. This might indicate —confirmation of whether
this was the case wil require future, more in-depth research— that
«Spanish industrial conditioning» was not an obstacle which was too com-
plicated for the agents in the industry to grasp. In other words, the Spanish
cork industry was submitted to a low degree of administrative regulation
which did not greatly alter the characteristics of the industrial establis-
hment in this sector. Apart from this, Buesa and Pires (2002, pp. 175-176)
place the cork sector among those which were totaly liberal or which were
only submitted to minimum technical conditioning between 1963-1980, as
was the case with black agglomerate, submitted to this control process
during the period 1968-1974.
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A search for the results of state intervention in the cork producing acti-
vities wil have to focus, above al, on an analysis of the State’s participation
in the development of basic industries and in the formation of infrastructu-
res for transportation and energy as wel as the capacity of the cork industry
to take advantage of the improvement resulting from this participation.
Effectively, apart from regulatory legislation, the two regimes saw indus-
trialization as the favoured route to economic growth. It therefore becomes
relevant to know how other initiatives implemented by the governments of
Franco and Salazar affected the cork industry.
In this field, two further measures taken by the Franco government are
important; first, the direct intervention of the State in the economy through
the creation of public companies; and second, the support for certain indus-
tries of national interest, which began in 1939. The first of these actions was
the foundation of the INI, a state-owned organization whose direct inter-
vention in different industrial branches is documented by Martín Aceña and
Comín (1991). From the information available, direct public intervention in
the cork sector, but with a reduced impact, was only considered in the scope
of the Plan Badajoz, one of the development plans in the later Franco
period. This plan merely resulted in the setting up of the Corchera
Extremeña industry in Mérida (Spain) and several measures adopted to
improve other already existing factories18.
However, without doubt, the most marked effects of Spanish industrial
policy in the sector took place after the approval of the LPNSI in 1939. The
cork industry was already considered to be of national interest during the
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), at a time when cork represen-
ted more than 5 per cent (in average) of the country’s total exports19. With
the arrival of Franco, cork was not held in such high esteem, probably due
to the lesser importance of the sector in the economy as a whole at the time
when the LPNSI was approved. It was not until until 1946 (Resolution from
the Ministry of Industry and Trade on 31st July), that the State, after hea-
ring the petitions of the industrial cork associations, decided to include the
cork industry in the list of industries of recognised interest for Spain. Only
after this year did Spanish cork producers have access to important fiscal
benefits and to the subsidies granted by the LPNSI, which may explain the
improvement in Spanish cork exports in the 1950s (graph 1).
Returning to Portugal, the effects on cork producing activities resulting
from the above-mentioned Law of National Electrification and the Law of
Industrial Development and Reorganization deserve some comments.
Regarding the latter, the cork sector led the list of industries to be reorga-
nized, due to its reduced size, dispersion and over-equipment20. However,
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the economic and organizational structure of the cork industry does not
seem to have undergone substantial changes until the 1960s, which reveals
a certain ineffectiveness of this policy. For its part, the fact that the Law of
National Electrification contributed to the industrial modernization in the
cork sector deserves two comments. First, the number of inactive establis-
hments in the cork industry was far higher in the 1960s —over 200 esta-
blishments according to Sampaio (1977)—, alowing us to forecast an
industrial framework dominated by smal production units which functio-
ned intermittently and were extremely weak in financial terms21. In second
place, the number of units without mechanised power was stil high at the
end of the 1960s, reaching around 50 per cent of the total of industrial
units22.
After this brief overview of the institutional situation of the industry, it
seems opportune to analyse some aspects which affected the sector’s
exports, namely those concerning commercial policy in the area of customs
and exchange rates23. Regarding the former, the Franco regime favoured
bilateral economic relations until 1959 so as to guarantee economic
autarky, keeping Spain out of the multilateral organizations which emerged
after the Second World War. During this period there were important res-
trictions on imports as a consequence of the lack of currency which Spain
suffered from. These restrictions were further intensified during the period
in which a policy of multiple exchange rates was in force, between 1948
and 1957.
However, this policy of «exchange rate engineering», discussed in
Serrano and Asensio (1997), was based on a progressive devaluation of the
peseta, which was an incentive for trade. As stated by Dias and Parejo
(2006b, p. 38), the devaluation of the peseta resulted in Spanish cork expor-
ters improving their sales abroad on an ongoing basis during that period
(graph 1)24.
In any case, it cannot be denied that the development of this industrial
activity was limited during the 1940s and 1950s in Spain due to the diffi-
culties involved in the renewal and increase of equipment and also the
acquisition of materials needed for manufacturing25. This was the price
paid for the lack of currency available to import what the industrial sector
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needed; meanwhile in Portugal the process of industrial modernization
became inevitable26.
After the Second World War, Portugal and Spain were absent from the
main conferences which prepared the new international economic order27.
However, ideological resistance by the Portuguese dictatorship to a greater
opening to the exterior —also very apparent in the Franco regime— did not
stop the internationalization of the Portuguese economy. According to
Valério (1993, p. 138), the «Cold War» situation accelerated the entry of
Portugal into institutions set up after the Second World War. The attitude
adopted by the Spanish government was quite different. In the same way,
the acceptance of the US Marshal Plan —from which Spain did not bene-
fit, due to moral condemnation by the United Nations of the Franco regime
between 1945 and 1950— made Portugal a founder member of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, and
also alowed Portugal to become a member of the European Payments
Union (EPU) in 1950.
The results of these smal steps towards a greater opening of the
Portuguese economy to the exterior were not, apparently, very significant
for cork exports. As we have already stated (graphs 1 and 2), Portuguese
exports decreased and the weight of unmanufactured cork products remai-
ned over 50 per cent until the 1950s. However, the folowing period saw the
beginning of a transition in the cork economy, marked by the loss of trade
of corkwood in planks and the domination of transformed cork products28.
From 1960 to 1975, Spain and Portugal definitively abandoned econo-
mic autarky in favour of a growth model oriented towards the development
of exports, accompanied by a policy which liberalised international econo-
mic relations, which in Portugal can be seen through adhesion to the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 and in the participation
by both Iberian nations in international trading and financial organiza-
tions29. In addition to al these aspects, Europe experienced its «golden
years» of economic growth from the 1950s onwards, with per capitaGDP
growing at an unprecedented rate, which was also the case in the two
Iberian countries.
In monetary terms, the exchange rate stability of the escudo relative to
the USD between 1949 and 1971 is important. This would have favoured the
cork industry and trade indirectly, namely with European countries which
belonged to the EPU. In fact, by becoming a member of the IMF, Portugal
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adhered to the gold exchange standard, maintaining a fixed rate in relation
to the USD, an aspect which was good for the strengthening of trading rela-
tions with the United States and Europe30. In turn, the Stabilization Plan of
the Spanish economy in 1959 adopted a new exchange rate of 60 pesetas per
USD, which represented an important devaluation of the peseta. The effects
of this devaluation were not, however, reflected in the export sector
(graph 1), probably because they were neutralised by the regime’s failure in
terms of customs policy and in the negotiation of trading agreements for
cork producers.
In the scope of this last question it is interesting to analyse the positions
of Portugal and Spain regarding EFTA and the EEC (European Economic
Community), the economic spaces where most of Europe’s trading exchan-
ges took place31.
Firstly, there is one underlying fact: Portugal was a founder member of
EFTA but Spain only signed some agreements on a case-by-case basis with
this association. What, then, was the significance for the cork business of
Portugal’s adhesion to EFTA?
The aim of EFTA was to create a space for free trading exchanges for
manufactured goods (Free Trade Zone). Upon its foundation, the
Stockholm Convention adopted a wider definition of «industrial products»
and cork was included in the general regime of free trade, undergoing suc-
cessive and scaled reductions over time of the customs rights originaly
established32. However, the effects upon cork exports were reduced, basi-
caly because the EFTA member states were not very important in terms of
purchases of Portuguese cork33. Moreover, it should be highlighted that cer-
tain customs and tariffs measures, such as the elimination of the prohibi-
tion to export unmanufactured cork to EFTA countries, worked against the
Portuguese agglomerates industry, already faced with competition from
synthetic products and a scarcity of raw materials. This might have contri-
buted to Portugal’s cork exports becoming heavily dominated by stoppers
after the second half of the 1960s34.
Regarding the EEC, both Spain and Portugal signed trading agreements.
The Portuguese agreement, in 1972, established a progressive reduction in
community customs levies on cork stoppers, until these were completely eli-
minated in 1977. Other cork products were also included as «sensitive pro-
ducts» —the case of cork in cubes, leaves or strips, non-specified manufac-
tured cork and agglomerated cork products—, and, as such, were subjected
to a more restrictive regime, based on quantity limits. In its turn, according
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to Parejo (2006, p. 257), the agreement signed by Spain in 1970 simply esta-
blished the reduction of customs duties for the entry of corkwood in planks
into the Community while levies on manufactured cork remained intact.
In conclusion, different factors of an institutional nature lay behind the
difficulties in the performance of the cork business in Spain, compared with
Portugal. First, the weak support given to the industry by Franco’s indus-
trial and trade policy; secondly, the greater difficulties in Spain regarding
supply, via importation, of machines, equipment and other material neces-
sary for the industry, for the reasons mentioned above; and last but not
least, the hermetic nature of the Spanish economy during the period of
Franco’s autarky, witnessed by Spain’s late entry into international financial
and trading organizations set up after the Second World War. Together, al
these aspects could only have contributed to the delay in the recovery of
export levels to those which had existed before the Civil War (certainly also
in industrial production) and apparently, according to Catalan (1995), this
was the case for Spanish industry as a whole.
Meanwhile, in Portugal, a policy which regulated private initiative ten-
ded to reinforce and promote the concentration of the cork industry while
also maintaining a certain freedom for the opening of new establishments
in the case of stoppers —perhaps a clear step to increase the presence of the
stopper industry. This became fundamental for international success, toge-
ther with a greater liberalization of exchanges after the Second World War;
the more so because the main competitors of Portugal and Spain, which did
not grow cork, were abandoning the industrial production of cork. Even the
creation of the Junta Nacional da Cortiça35in 1936 reveals the level of inte-
rest which the cork business had achieved in Portugal. The results of this
organization’s actions are yet to be studied, but there are elements which
indicate they were positive in its role as a privileged interlocutor and inter-
mediary in relations with the State, and also as a boost to external trade;
both functions were important in a business marked by the reduced size
and dispersion of its industrial establishments and by its orientation to the
exterior markets.
2.2.  The incidence of policies regarding forests and salaries
on production costs: the consolidation of Portugal’s
comparative advantage?
In the preceding paragraphs, we have defended the importance of insti-
tutional factors in the creation of conditions favourable to the expansion of
the cork producing business in Portugal, through the implementation of a
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set of measures which tended to favour the industrial and exporting sectors
of this business. Due to the fundamental importance of external markets in
the success of the Iberian cork sector, it becomes obvious that the expansion
of this activity in Portugal would only have been viable if international
demand had recognised some competitive advantage in Portuguese cork
exports over those of Spain, always entertaining the hypothesis that both
countries’ cork products were homogenous. As stated in the first part of this
study, Spain lost an important part of its export quota in cork products
(table 1).
One question arises out of this context: could the institutional aspects
have contributed to the creation of heterogeneous conditions in Spain and
Portugal in terms of production costs, thus reinforcing Portugal’s competi-
tive advantage? We refer namely to raw material and labour costs, the most
important factors in the cost structure of the cork industry.
We estimate that the raw material —virgin cork and reproduction cork—36
represents around half of the production costs in an activity such as the
stopper industry37. With the exception of Zapata (2006), there are no long
series of prices of raw material published which alow us to make a com-
parative study of their evolution in Spain and Portugal. Highlighting this
theme, when comparing the cork business in the two countries, is, for this
reason, a novelty and a starting point for research into this subject38.
If we accept that the price of cork is a function of the supply capacity of
cork oak groves, Portugal clearly had a certain advantage in the supply of
cheap raw material, because it produced half of the world’s cork, according
to Sampaio (1977, p. 89). Despite the negative evolution of the cork oak tree
area during the Second World War, the forestry policy to defend and deve-
lop the cork producing region led to the stabilization of that area in
Portugal, at least during the period in question39. On the contrary, estima-
tes made by GEHR (2003) for Spain indicate that cork production stabili-
sed in the period 1946-979 and, presumably, the level of effort made by the
state in the upkeep of cork oaks was lower.
Apart from the area planted with cork oaks, the supply of the raw mate-
rial in the internal market could stil have increased through the importa-
tion of unmanufactured cork. However, this was practicaly prohibited in
the two Iberian countries during most of the period covered by the dicta-
torships; at least, it was not a resource that was used by the Spanish and
Portuguese producers in the four decades under study. Besides, the expor-
INCENTIVES OR OBSTACLES? INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CORK BUSINESS IN THE..
37
40 AMSP, SNMC, caja 357, Transportes.
tation of unmanufactured cork was normal, since it was to supply the deve-
loped countries with a cork industry but without cork oaks, this having con-
tributed towards a decrease in the raw material available for the national
industry.
This last aspect involved a further relevant question regarding the supply
of raw material: the customs measures adopted by the respective dictators-
hips to control the commercial exchanges in the cork sector during the
period under analysis. This study was carried out by Dias and Parejo
(2006b), whose conclusions aid an improved understanding of the position
of the two countries regarding the manufacturing of cork. Salazar’s regime
maintained the prohibition on the export of unmanufactured cork which
came into force at the beginning of the 20thcentury, with one exception,
after 1960, for the EFTA member states. In Spain, the documentation of the
SNMC reveals enough information to show that the customs measures
adopted for the protection of the industry had a conjunctural and short
term nature, not taking into account strategic criteria involving trading
policy and, much less, political measures affecting the cork industry. The
continuous revision of the customs measures adopted reinforces this idea,
contrasting with the strictness with which they were applied in Portugal, at
least until 1960. What is more, when the prohibition to export cork was con-
templated in Spain, this was almost always restricted to the cork coming
from the north-east of the country (Catalonia), freeing the exportation of
cork from Spanish Extremadura and Andalusia, albeit with some difficul-
ties posed by customs tariffs.
However we also have to mention the problems related with supply of
the raw material. As far as this issue is concerned, the information availa-
ble for Spain comes from the SNMC40and indicates the existence of serious
logistical problems regarding the access of raw materials and distribution
of the finished product. According to this source, there were serious trans-
portation problems in Spain, presumably greater than those in Portugal,
both in terms of internal and external circulation of the products. As
regards internal circulation, we underline the difficulties in transporting
cork extracted from south-west Spain to the cork industries in Catalonia (by
train or coaster trade), due to the scarcity of wagons or boats, or high trans-
portation costs. On the other hand, as regards exportation to external mar-
kets, the absence of quality Spanish ports was notorious, in comparison
with the port of Lisbon, a compulsory port of cal for European routes des-
tined for America.
The study of costs arising from salaries is also important in an industry
in which labour is so intensive. In this study, it is once again fundamental
to make a comparative analysis to understand the question; however, the
lack of information regarding the evolution of salaries, especialy in Spain,
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appears as another problem to be overcome41. There is, however, some
information available worth examining in this aspect. The existence of
information from SNMC, although it may be open to a certain degree of cri-
ticism, alows us to present a hypothesis that salary contention in Portugal
was greater than that in Spain. In fact, salaries in the cork industry were
regulated during Salazar’s dictatorship, this salary policy being part of a
wider labour policy more oriented towards the cork industry42. Due to the
constant crises in this sector, a result of the international conjuncture which
was not always favourable to exports, this policy tended to increase the pre-
carious nature of the labour market at the time, which was aggravated by
the reduced size of the production units and by their low level of technolo-
gical equipment. However, more than contributing towards this, the policy
resulted in two major consequences. On one hand, it gave rise to the spatial
concentration of the transforming industry, especialy in the stopper
industry, in the district of Aveiro (in the north of Portugal)43. Minimum sala-
ries in the cork sector, according to professional category, were fixed by
establishing a salary differential between the North, Centre and South from
the outset, a policy which was unfavourable to the latter two regions44.
We defend, as a hypothesis, the existence of lower labour costs in
Portugal compared to Spain. Obviously, without closing the matter here, we
believe that this hypothesis can be reinforced with various arguments. The
first of these is based on information dated December 194545. According to
this information, the social obligations of the Portuguese cork producers
were far below those which the Spanish entrepreneurs were obliged to pay
their workers. These social charges were around 15 per cent of the salary in
Portugal, while in the Spanish cork industry, they were around 60 per cent.
A second argument is related with the dismissal of workers, which was
made difficult in Spain by labour laws which restricted it from the begin-
ning of Franco’s dictatorship; a similar situation applied, for example, with
the reduction of working days per week46.
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Finaly, the hypothesis is further reinforced by a previously mentioned
fact: the lack of rigidity with which the Spanish policy of salary contention
was undertaken. The strangulation created in the Spanish economy during
the beginning of the 1950s obliged the authorities to raise salaries, which
was also the case in the cork sector. For example, in January 1954, the
Labour Ministry decreed an increase of 10 per cent on the basic salary and
of the family complement for workers in factories where cork was transfor-
med47. One year later, the workers of the cork sector in the north-east
requested a further rise of some 30 per cent as wel as the unification of the
regulations concerning holidays within the wood sector48.
3.  CONCLUSIONS
The quantitative analysis carried out shows that the competitive advan-
tages of the Portuguese cork industry were already consolidated when
Spanish economic policy changed direction with the Stabilization Plan of
the economy in 1959 and the resulting trade liberalization. The greater
importance of the exports of manufactured cork in the total value of exports
in the 1960s further confirms the leadership and specialization in Portugal
in the transformation of cork, a result which was reached after almost three
decades of advances and retreats in this area, but with favourable institu-
tional conditions, greater openness to the exterior and greater acquired
experience, sustained from then on.
The causes of the underlying slowness to the afirmation of this leaders-
hip probably resided in Portugal’s greater backwardness in producing trans-
formed cork, its industrial sector being more connected to the preparation of
the raw material. The competition from other countries, whether or not they
grew cork, the lack of capital and, as a consequence, of private initiative,
among other factors, could explain this backwardness, despite the fact that
the country presented itself as the number one cork producer in the world.
It would be reasonable to state, in accordance with the facts mentioned
above, that during the 1930s and 1940s a framework favourable to the rein-
forcement of the transforming industry was created in Portugal, where the
legal framework and economic policy measures —in which the IC assumed
great importance, along with the policy changes in customs duties, and
salaries, among others— were boosted by a positive external conjuncture
for Portuguese cork interests; or, in other words, a difficult one for the inte-
rests of the other main producer, Spain. In this way, Portugal was able to
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increase its exports of manufactured cork and, consequently, its income
from external trade.
Portugal’s membership of EFTA seems to be less significant in terms of
providing an explanation for its success, due to the fact that the main
buyers of Portuguese cork were outside EFTA. In relation to the trade agre-
ement signed by Portugal with the EEC in 1972, the consideration of cork
interests, unlike the situation in Spain, was certainly a very relevant aspect
in the success enjoyed by Portuguese manufactured products in the subse-
quent period.
The situation of decadence in the Spanish cork industry is the other side
of the coin. The model of economic growth folowed, based upon a com-
mercial policy which closed itself in economic autarky and upon industrial
growth based on the substitution of imports, contributed towards a reduc-
tion of competitive capacity in the Spanish economy and, as such, of the
cork industry, which was highly dependent on external markets, not only as
regards placing its products but also in obtaining equipment and auxiliary
materials for the production process. The lack of an internal price control
policy and the inadequate exchange rate policy folowed by Franco’s govern-
ments were highly disadvantageous for the Spanish cork industry, creating
a spiral of high production costs, namely in the labour and raw materials
areas, resulting in a loss of competitiveness in external markets.
The situation would not have been so serious for the Spanish cork sec-
tor if, at the beginning of the Franco period, the priority attributed to it by
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera had been maintained. In this case, it
would have benefited from fiscal and economic support sufficient to out-
weigh the adverse effects. This did not happen until the end of the 1940s,
but then the attention paid to the cork sector was substantialy less than
that paid to it in Portugal during Salazar’s dictatorship.
In this way, the «Iberization» process of the cork business, which started
to take place from the middle of the 20thcentury —alongside the abando-
ning of cork production in developed nations which were not cork gro-
wers—, finaly benefited more the Portuguese cork producing sector. This
was due to the fact that it presented the best competitive conditions in
external markets, or rather, had more abundant raw material, labour costs
which were presumably more reduced and a greater integration in interna-
tional exchange flows. The change in the roles of world leadership in the
area of manufactured products would certainly be an inevitable process.
ABBREVIATIONS USED
EEC   European Economic Community
IC   Industrial Conditioning
EFTA   European Free Trade Association
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IMF   International Monetary Fund
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
INI   National Institute of Industry
LODNI  Law for Organization and Defence of National Industry
LPNSI  Law for Protection of the New Strategic Industries
OEEC   Organization for European Economic Cooperation
SNMC  Sindicato Nacional de la Madera y del Corcho
EPU   European Payments Union
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